STANDARDS OF DISCLOSURE IN PROXY
SOLICITATION OF UNLISTED SECURITIES

T

may be defined as the authority a stockholder gives to another to vote for him in the affairs of the corporation. It is a form of
agency, the proxy holder being an agent with general or special powers.'
The proxy thus provides the stockholder an opportunity to participate in
the affairs of the corporation when he is unable personally to attend
stockholders' meetings. Although virtually every jurisdiction has recognized the utility of the proxy by legislative provision,2 it has frequently
been misused. Management has often used the proxy to perpetuate
itself in office, to formulate and execute self-serving policies, and to
render the corporation subservient to its will. These undesirable results
are often achieved by withholding vital information from the stockholders, information they should have if they are to make intelligent
decisions on whether to grant their proxies. It is not uncommon, for
example, for management, as well as other groups that are vying for
control, to obtain proxies from apathetic stockholders without relating
the slightest information on how they will be voted or who will vote
them.3
HE PROXY

FACTORS GIVING RISE TO INADEQUATE

DISCLOSURE

The widespread failure to give adequate information to stockholders
when their proxies are solicited is attributable not only to the apathy of
stockholders, but also to many other factors. One contributing influence
is the reluctance of the courts to examine proxy solicitation data and
pass on the adequacy of disclosure when called upon to do so by an
aggrieved stockholder through injunction, quo warranto, or mandamus
'See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 178-80 (rev. ed. iq96) [hereinafter cited as
BALLANTINEl; 5 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 2055-62 (repl. vol. z952)

[hereinafter cited as FLETCHER].
'Iowa is the only jurisdiction where the right to vote by proxy is not expressly
provided by statute; but the mention of "proxy voting" implies the right. See IOWA
CODE § 49-.47 (Supp. 1958).

a "Beause many small stockholders almost automatically sign and return the proxy
requested by the management, ability to direct the proxy machinery, coupled with a
substantial minority of ownership, commonly adds up to ability to choose directors."
Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1958).
See also BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PROPERTY 69-x25
(1932);

BURNHAM, THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION ch. 8 (1941).
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proceedings.4

State v. Meridith' illustrates this judicial passivity. In
that case the plaintiff and the defendant were the only candidates for
election to a vacancy on the corporation's board of directors, and the
defendant had been elected by the use of proxies solicited for the
election. The plaintiff instituted a quo warranto proceeding to test the
validity of the election, alleging that the stockholders who gave their
proxies to the defendant were not fully informed of his policies. The
proxies were obtained by a peremptory demand made by the defendant
in his official capacity as president. The following brief letter contained
the only information the defendant gave the stockholders when he
solicited their proxies:
Dear Member: The annual meeting of this Association will be held
January 18, 1916. We would like to have you as a policy holder represented
at this meeting. Will you kindly date and sign your name to the attached
stamped proxy card and mail to us immediately....
7
In upholding the election, the court stated:

[W] e are satisfied that so long as the proxy is given by a member having
a vote and is his voluntary act, and the written authority is executed and
filed in the proper time, the vote is not invalidated because of the improper
solicitation of the proxy.
This and similar decisions amount to judicial disenfranchisement of
stockholders who depend upon proxy representation as their only means
of participating in the affairs of the corporation.' Their right to voice
"It is interesting to note that twelve states have statutes specifically providing for
judicial review of corporate elections. They are California, Delaware, Idaho, Montana,
Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, South
Dakota, and Virginia. Illustrative statutes are DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 225 (1953);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-114 (i950); N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 25. In all other states,
resort must be had to common-law proceedings. See, e.g., s FLETCHER § 2073;
Aranow & Einhorn, State Court Review of Corporate Elections, 56 Co.uzi. L. REv.
155 (956).

An excellent discussion of stockholder relief under the Securities and Exchange Commission's proxy rules is found in Aranow & Einhorn, Corporate Proxy Contests: Enforcenent of the SEC Proxy Rules by the Commission and Private Parties, 3 z N.Y.U.L.
REv. 875 (1956); Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules in the Courts, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1o41
(196o).

183 Iowa 783, 167 N.W. 6z6 (i918).
No stockholder could make an intelligent decision on whether to give his proxy
from the information disclosed in such a letter.
7183 Iowa at 789, 167 N.W. at 627.
'See generally Tilden v. Quaker Oats Co., i F.zd 16o ( 7 th Cir. 1924) McClean
v. Bradley, 28z Fed. io2 (6th Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 619 (-9-4), In re
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their opinions at stockholders' meetings is lost unless they are fairly and
fully informed of the policies of the soliciting group.
Another factor that has led to withholding information from stockholders in proxy solicitation is the attitude of management. Looking
upon disclosure as a burdensome formality, management welcomes
judicial laissez faire and, understandably, declines to assume voluntarily
the burden of adequate disclosure. Likewise, the "phenomenal growth
in the size of corporations, the number of stockholders, and the widespread geographic distribution of stock ownership," as well as the absence of legislative intervention at the state level, have played their
parts in fostering nondisclosure."1
FEDERAL REGULATION OF LISTED SECURITIES

In 1934, Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act, 2 which contains provisions designed to ensure to the stockholder full and adequate
disclosure of material information by soliciting groups." Section I4(a)
Chilsen, 19 Del. Ch. 398, i68 Adt. 82 (Ch. 1933) i Gow v. Consolidated Copper Mines
Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172, 189 Atl. 142 (Ch. 1933)5 Hexter v. Columbia Baking Co.,
z6 Del. Ch. 263, 145 Adt. 115 (Ch. 1929) McKee v. Home Savings & Trust Co.,
2Z Iowa 731, 98 N.W. 6o9 (i9o4) 5 Schmidt v. Mitchell, ioi Ky. 570, 41 S.W.
929 (1897) 5 Bache v. Central Leather Co., 78 N.J. Eq. 484, 81 At. 571 (Ch. 1911);
Cone v. Russel, 48 N.J. Eq. 2o8, zi At. 847 (Ch. 189i) ; Rabenold v. Associated Gas
& Elec. Co., 266 N.Y.S. 5zo (Sup. Ct. 1933).
'See generally ARANow & EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
81-84 (1957)5 19 FLETCHER §§ 9012, 9013, 9016; LOss, SECURITIES REGULATION
618-i9 (i95i) [hereinafter cited as Loss]; BERLE & MEANS, op. cit.supra
note 3, at 81-89, 139, 2455 Note, 78 SOL. J. 869, 870 (1934).
" ARANOW & EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 81 (1957).
11 "Managements of properties owned by the investing public should not be per521-23,

mitted to perpetuate themselves by the misuse of corporate proxies. Insiders having
little or no substantial interest in the properties they manage have often retained control without an adequate disclosure of their interest and without an adequate explanation of the management policies they intend to pursue. Insiders have at times solicited
proxies without fairly informing the stockholders of the purposes for which the proxies
are to be used and have often used such proxies to take from the stockholders for their
own selfish advantage valuable property rights." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 7 3 d CONG.,
2d SESs. 13-14 0934). See also S. REP. No. 792, 7 3 d CONG., 2d SEss. xz (1934).
One writer has gone even further in describing the evils that have resulted from
the misuse of the proxy by stating that what developed "was the separation of ownership from control-a genuine revolution in the dynamics of economic institutions."
ARANOW & EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 8
also Loss 520-23, 618-i9.

(-957).

See

Stat. 895 0934), i5 U.S.C. § 78(n) (958).
"In addition to facilitating intelligent voting by the stockholder, the proxy regulations have the further purpose of giving him the opportunity to present proposals for the
consideration of his fellow stockholders through the medium of the management proxy
2248
21
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makes it unlawful to solicit a proxy from the holder of any security
registered on a national exchange except in accordance with rules and
regulations prescribed by the Commission. 1 4 Briefly, the purpose of the
proxy rules laid down by the Commission is "the disclosure of information by those who solicit proxies by means of a proxy statement
which must accompany each request for a proxy, consent, or authorization ....W5
The 1934 Act and the rules under it, however, are of limited applicability because they apply only to "registered" or "listed" securities',
and do not apply at all if there is no solicitation.17 The effect of the
statement."

ARANOW & EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 8z
See also BALLANTINE § 18i; 5 FLETCHER § 2052.1; WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPORATED 157-58 (193x);
Bernstein & Fischer, The Regulation of the
Solicitation of Proxies, Some Reflections on Corporate Democracy, 7 U. CHI. L. REV.
226 (1940); Dean, Non-Compliance uwith Proxy Regulations-Effect on Ability of
Corporation to Hold Valid Meeting, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 483 (1939), Note, 53 HARv. L.
REv. 1x65 (1940); Note, 33 ILL. L. REV. 914, 922 (1939); Note, 13 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 297 0939).
"'The first of these proxy rules and regulations were published on September 24,
1935, and were known as the 'ILA Rules." They were almost too experimental to be
regulatory and required the issuance of a proxy statement that contained a brief description of matters to be considered at the future stockholders' meeting, prohibited false
and misleading statements, and required the filing of these materials at the time they
were mailed to stockholders. See Exch. Act Release No. 1823 (Aug. II, 1938); 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a (1949).
For a comprehensive outline of the history of the SEC proxy rules, see ARANOW &
E NHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 84-90 (1957); Loss 525-35;
Bayne, Around and Beyond the SEC-The Disenfranchised Stockholder, 26 IND. L.J.
207 (.951).
:5 BALLANTINE 414.
"Registration on a national exchange is a corporate prerogative. The corporation
does not become subject to SEC regulation unless it chooses to do so. See ARANOW &
EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 8 5 (1957).
Criticizing this characteristic of the SEC proxy regulation, a writer has observed:
"It is a strange sort of regulatory scheme which gives individual members of the
class to be regulated the power to decide whether the regulation should apply to them."
Loss 615.
Another writer has maintained that this listing requirement is an unrealistic
standard by which to measure the need for proxy regulation. ARANOW & EINHORN,
PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 86 (1957).
See also Bayne, supra note
(1957).

14, at 223.

" "Through its administration of the proxy regulations, the Commission has become
increasingly aware that some issuers have avoided adequate disclosure to their stockholders by the simple device of not soliciting proxies. This is especially vicious because, in many cases, the failure to solicit proxies prevents the presence of a quorum
and thus results in self-perpetuation of management. As a consequence, stockholders
are deprived of an opportunity to pass upon the activities of management, and to remove
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listing requirement is to exclude from regulation a vast majority of the
corporations in the United States.' 8
Recognizing the evils incident to freedom from regulation, the
Securities and Exchange Commission undertook two major studies of the
soliciting practices of groups who sought proxies from owners of unlisted
securities.' 9 In the first of these studies, an extensive survey was made
of all the proxy material distributed to stockholders in i943 and I944.
by the management of seventy-six domestic corporations with assets
worth three million dollars or more whose voting stock had unlisted
trading privileges. The findings of the Commission dearly showed the
evils resulting from the lack of standards of fair disclosure. Proxy materials distributed in connection with eighty-nine per cent of the annual
stockholders' meetings of these corporations did not name the persons
for whom the stock would be voted as directors; nor was the interest of
officers and directors described in any manner for 151 of the 152
meetings involved. In addition, the Commission found that some
ninety-five per cent of the corporations did not afford their stockholders
an opportunity to vote yes or no on specific issues through a convenient
ballot-type or box-type proxy.2"
These studies culminated in a report to Congress that recommended
an amendment to the 1934 Act that would have required companies
engaged in interstate commerce to register with the Commission all
bad management from office, SEC, Report on Proposals for Amendments to the Secunties Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, H.R. Comm. Print, 71st
CONG., 1st SESS. 35 (594.). Loss 555-6o5 Dean, supra note 13, at 4875 Bayne, supra
note 14, at 210-17.
In addition, see LATrIN, COIu'ORATIONS ch. 7, § 4. (1959) 5 Aranow & Einhorn,
Proxy Regulations: Suggested Improvements, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306 (1959)
Bayne, supra note 14, at 21o-22z2 Smith v. Republic Pictures Corp., 144 N.Y.S.zd 14z
(Sup. Ct. 1955).
"sBayne, supra note 14, at 223. Another excellent discussion concerning the applicability and coverage of the SEC proxy rules is found in Friedman, SEC Regulation of
CorporateProxies, 63 HARY. L. REV. 796, 814-2i (5950).
" SEC, A Proposal to Safeguard Investors in Unregistered Securities, H.R. Doc.
No. 672, 7 9 th CONG., 2d SaSS. (1946) 5 Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 4399 (Jan. 9,
See also, H.R. Doc. No. 464, SiSt CONG., 2d SEss. (950), embodying Presi1950).
dent Truman's recommendation to Congress to accept the SEC's proposals.
" In addition, the Commission concluded that in only one case was there disclosure of the security holdings of directors and nominees; that none of the proxy statements stated the remuneration of management5 and finally, that in a great percentage
of the selected materials, the annual report of the company was not sent to the stockholders until after the meeting had been held. SEC, A Proposalto Safeguard Investors
in Unregistered Securities, H.R. Doc. No. 672, 7 9 th CONG., 2d SESS. 18-2o (1946).
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securities not listed on an exchange.2 1 The amendment, however, would
have exempted any company with less than three million dollars in
assets and three hundred security holders.2 2 These recommendations
were not accepted by Congress. Because the majority of corporations
are not within the purview of the Securities and Exchange Commission's
regulation, stockholder protection must come from other sources-the
courts and the legislatures.
JUDICIAL STANDARDS

OF DISCLOSURE

Because of judicial reluctance squarely to meet the problem of ade-

quate disclosure in proxy solicitation, there is a paucity of case law
available for analysis. In only two jurisdictions, New York and Delaware, have cases arisen that warrant investigation.
"xIn 1950, Senator Frear sponsored a bill to effectuate the requested amendments.
S. 2408, Sist CONG., ISt SESS. (1949). See Loss 63-22; Comment, 45 ILL. L. REV.
263 (950)i Bayne, supra note 14, at 222-30; Gilbert, Management and the Public
Shareholder, 28 HARV. Bus. REV. 4, 79-80 (.950).
Similar legislation was unsuccessfully introduced in 1955 by Senator Fulbright based
on a study made in 1955 of the stock market. S. REP. No. 2054, 84th CONG., ist
SESs. (1955). See ARANOW & EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL

87 (957).
22 Even as qualified, however, it was estimated that the proposed
amendments would
have pulled I,75o additional companies under SEC regulation. SEC, A Proposal to
Safeguard Investors in Unregistered Securities, H.R. Doc. No. 672, 7 9 th CONG., 2d
SESS. 27 (t946).

Under the more liberal Fulbright Bill, supra note zi, which would have exempted
any company with assets of less than $S,ooo,ooo or 5oo security holders, it was estimated that the SEC's control would have been extended to an additional 12oo companies with assets over $35,oo0,0oo,00o.
N.Y. Times, May 19, x956, p. 27, col. 2.
See also Hearings on S. 2408, A Bill to Amend the Securities Exchange Act of
8zst CONG., 2d SESS. 23 (i950), wherein Mr. Loss, speaking in support of the

5934,

bill, stated, concerning the results of the second SEC study: "We found some improvements over 1946, but most of the companies, most of the presently unregulated
companies, continue to request their stockholders to give their proxies, exercise their
corporate franchise, without any adequate information."
Likewise, the New York Stock Exchange has attempted to extend the proxy rules
to unregistered companies by requiring members who participate in the solicitation of
proxies to file with the Exchange information equivalent to that required by the SEC.
As this requirement would apply only to contested solicitations, however, it would have
no teeth in it as a regulatory measure. Loss 488-89, 494, 528. For the part the New
York Stock Exchange played in the SEC amendment program, see Loss 247-53.
See also GILBERT & GILBERT, SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF STOCKHOLDERS'
ACTIVITIES AT CORPORATE MEETINGS 184 (1955); Emerson & Latcham, Proxy Contests: Competition for Management Through Proxy Solicitation, 8 Sw. L.J. 403 (1954)
(an interesting and practical survey of 1953 and 1954 proxy contests).
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A. Delaware Cases
In Empire So. Gas Co. v. Gray,2 the plaintiff alleged that the
soliciting group had led stockholders to believe that they possessed
authority from the board of directors to solicit their proxies when in fact
they did not. The gravamen of the action was fraudulent use of the
corporate name and authority. The solicitation data was untruthfully
signed, "By Authority Of The Board Of Directors," and contained only
the following information: (I) a request to stockholders to execute and
return the enclosed proxy if they wished their stock voted 24 (2) a statement that the expense of the proxy solicitation would be paid by the
corporation; and (3) the name of one person who was to be elected a
director of the corporation. 25 The Delaware Court of Chancery held
that the soliciting group misrepresented a material issue when it led
stockholders to believe that the solicitation data was issued by the
authority of the management; that soliciting groups have the burden of
avoiding statements that are misleading; and that the burden cannot
be put on stockholders to be "eternally vigilant" against deception."
The misrepresentation-of-a-material-issue test, however, does little to
guarantee the stockholder enough information to make an intelligent
choice, for it only assures him that what is disclosed is not misrepresented.
In Kaufman 'v. Shoenburg, 7 the defendant officers sought the adoption of a stock option plan in which they, as officers of the corporation,
would have participated. At the time, there was an incentive compensation plan already in operation, but the defendants were soliciting
proxies without informing the stockholders of this similar plan. The
plaintiff, seeking to enjoin the passage of the second plan, charged that
23

29 Del. Ch. 95, 46 A.zd 741 (Ch.
o4, 46 A.2d at 745.

946).

",Id. at

It is interesting to note the language used by the soliciting group here. The stockholder is told, in essence, that he either votes by returning the proxy or does not vote

at all. This somewhat coercive persuasion is indicative of the practices indulged in by
many groups when proxies are solicited. One judge has most appropriately described
it as "a battle of proxies and not of wits." Berendt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., io8 N.J.
Eq. 148, 151, 154 Atl. 321,

322

(Ch. 1931).

" The information disclosed to the stockholder in this case can hardly be expected
adequately to inform any security holder of the issues upon which he is expected to
vote. The return of a proxy in response to this solicitation can only be considered an
automatic response due to stockholder inertia.
29
2733

Del. Ch. 95, xo6, 46 A.2d 741, 746 (Ch. 1931).
Del. Ch. 211, 9z A.-d 786 (1952).
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the defendants' failure to advise stockholders of the existing corporate
policy of incentive compensation was a deliberate bad faith omission of
material information.2" Pointing out that the proxy statement referred
to "additional compensation" received by the directors, the Court of
Chancery concluded that the omission of an explicit reference to the
existing profit-sharing plan was not material.2 9 The language of the
opinion, however, dearly indicates that the omission of material information from a proxy statement would be sufficient to invalidate the
proxy.
The combined effect of the Gray and Kaufman cases, therefore, is
that materiality embraces omissive as well as affirmative misrepresentations. 3 Though vague, the present Delaware test of adequate disclosure affords some guarantee to the stockholder that he will not be
It should be noted here that inadequate disclosure may occur in one of three ways:
Probably the most common type of disclosure is partial disclosure. Here the
soliciting group gives the stockholder some information, but there simply is not enough
for an intelligent election. This is the most damaging since it is the hardest of the
three to check. There is no fraud, misrepresentation, or deliberate omission- thus the
courts find it extremely troublesome.
- (2) The second and most flagrant type of inadequate disclosure is that which indudes fraudulent and misleading statements. Here statements are made to deceive the
stockholder into giving his proxy. Courts have little or no trouble at all invalidating
proxies so acquired.
(3) Deliberate omission of important information, that information which, if given,
may very well keep the stockholder from returning his proxy, gives the courts little
trouble. Some courts, however, place a heavy burden on the stockholder to prove the
omitted material significant and the omission fraudulent. See, e.g., Schlensky v. South
'

(3)

Parkway Bldg. Corp., 350 Ill. App. 293, ii2 N.E.zd 716 (1953).
Contra, In re
Scheuer, 59 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
"An interesting and related problem concerning the adequacy of disclosure in the
ratification of executive compensation is found in O'Neal, Stockholder Attacks on
Corporate Pension Systems, 2 VAND. L. REV. 351, 376 (1948), where the author states:

"The information most likely to be concealed is, of course, participation of offlcers
or directors in pension benefits, the size or cost of their pension and the nearness of key
personnel to the retirement age. It would appear that where executives or directors are
to benefit from a pension plan the communications disclosing their interest 'must lay
bare
the truth without ambiguity or reservation in all its stark significance'."
"See also Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 523 (x933);
WASHINGTON &
ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE

197-2o6, 264, 353-55 (rev.

ed. i95i).
" The extension of the doctrine of materiality to cover omissions as well as aflirmative misrepresentations does much to aid the stockholder, but the damage done by so
many soliciting groups by merely giving little or no information to the stockholder is
not corrected by this extension. An excellent example is Berendt v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., io8 N.J. Eq. 148, 154 At. 321 (Ch. 193).
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deceived and that, in most instances, he will be given enough information
to make an informed decision when his proxy is solicited.,'
B. New York Cases
The development of the New York rule may be traced by a chronological examination of four cases. In the first case, In re Scheuer,32
the solicitation data provided stockholders included statements of an
alleged decline in earnings due to the cost of new equipment that had
been deducted from gross earnings. In truth, the expenditures were
charged to capital? 3 An aggrieved stockholder brought an action to
solicited declared invalid. The New York Supreme
have the proxies so
34
Court stated that :
[T]he activities of the campaign managers . . . resulted in deviations
from the exacting standards of fairness now generally agreed as incumbent

upon those engaged in securing proxies.
However, the court not only failed to relate the nature of this "general
agreement," but also declined to enumerate the particulars of these
"exacting standards." Thus, the decision did little to establish a workable standard of disclosure.
A more realistic and less uncertain standard of disclosure emerged
from the second case, Continental Bank & Trost Co. v. '2oo Madison

Ave. Corp.,3 5 where it was alleged that the soliciting group misrepresented their voting strength as well as the earning power of the corporation in order to obtain proxies 6 Excluding from consideration what
1

" The Delaware view of materiality has been employed in a broader sense by other
jurisdictions. These cases have generally held that the stockholder must be given
enough information for an intelligent vote, but are limited principally to ratification.
See, e.g., Gottlieb v. McGee, 34 Del. Ch. 537, 107 A.2d 240 (Ch. 1954) ; Kerbs v.
Winchell v.
California E. Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 395, 94 A.zd 217 (Ch. 1953)
Plywood Corp., 324 Mass. 171, 85 N.E.2d 313 (1949) ; Rosenfeld v. Fairchild
Engine & Airplane Corp., 284 App. Div. 2oi, 132 N.Y.S.zd 273 (1954), aft'd, 309
N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955).
But see Schlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 350 Il. App. 293, 112 N.E.2d
716 (1953). See also Demmler, Private Suits Based on Violations of the Proxy Rides,,
2o U. PITT. L. REv. 587 (i959).
12 59

N.Y.S.zd 500 (Sup. Ct.

1942).

"Furthermore, the data repeated laudatory statements about the soliciting group
uttered by a brokerage firm that had been paid for its praise.
ad 59 N.Y.S.2d 500, Soi (Sup. Ct. 1942).
543 N.Y.S.2d 402 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
"oThe court pointed out that this was not important since at all times the voting
strength was substantial. As to other types of fraud in the solicitation of proxies' that
may warrant vitiation of the proxies, see Lyon v. Holton, 167 Misc. 585, 4. N.Y.S.2d

632
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variances ' 37

it termed the "unimportant and inconsequential
of the solicitation data, the New York Supreme Court concluded that there was no
fraud by way of concealment of material facts. Furthermore, the court
declared, none of the statements alleged to be untrue "would influence
any layman to give his proxy where he would not otherwise have done
so."38 Evidently, the court deemed it necessary not only to find a material misrepresentation but also an inducement of the stockholder to give
his proxy in reliance on the misrepresented statements. Although a significant improvement over Scheuer and the first real effort on the part
of the New York court to establish a general standard of disclosure, the
39
case leaves many questions unanswered.
Two years later, in Wyatt v. Armstrong," the same court disregarded the language of the Madison Avenue case and spoke once again
in the tradition of the Scheuer case when it announced that a corporate
election wherein proxies were used would be set aside if the methods
of obtaining the proxies were "so clouded with doubt and tainted with
questionable circumstances that the standards of fair dealing"'" had been
violated. As in Sclzer, the court failed to spell out the nature and
scope of these "standards." In concluding, however, that the defendants
were guilty of concealment amounting to misrepresentation and fraud,
the court exhibited an attitude inclined to protection of stockholders.
It announced that the stockholders were deprived "of their freedom to
vote at corporate elections in the light of a complete disclosure of all
relevant facts and circumstances." 4 The court's conclusion merely
states what all acknowledge to be the desired end. What the court
declined to do, however, was to recite a workable standard whereby
those who seek proxies will know what degree of disclosure is "complete."
538 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (concerning the concealment of a fraudulent corporate purchase)
Segel v. Bresnick, 127 N.Y.L.J. 1551 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1952).
37 43 N.Y.S.zd 402, 406 (Sup. Ct. -943).
"Id. at 407-08.
" For instance, the court, instead of speaking in terms of materiality, relevancy, or
similar labels, should have discussed whether a minimum standard of disclosure should
be laid down to cover future cases, protection of the stockholders, how much they should
be told in particular situations, and the duty of management to do so. These cases
should be decided only after a look at the overall picture of inadequate disclosure.
The imposition of a policy favoring fair and full disclosure should be the principal
consideration, and with this would come relief in the particulars.
Lox86 Misc. zx6, 59 N.Y.S.2d 5oz (Sup. Ct. 1945).
"I1d. at 22o, 59 N.Y.S.zd at 5o5.
"I1d. at 224, 59 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
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In the last case of the series, In re Hoe & Co.,4 the present New
York rule was enunciated. Here a stockholders' committee obtained
control of the board of directors. Some of the members of the defeated
management group petitioned the court to have the election set aside on
the ground that the committee's solicitation data contained false statements against the management. Relief was denied. The court held
that the result of action taken by stockholders will not be disturbed unless it is clearly established that the solicitation was so tainted with
fraud that an inequitable result was accomplished.44
OTHER APPLICABLE PROXY PRINCIPLES

Many cases do not discuss what constitutes adequate disclosure,
but afford relief by the application of well-settled principles of the law
of proxies. Generally, the use of the proxy is limited to participation
in the ordinary, as opposed to the extraordinary, affairs of the corporation. Affairs that have been held to be outside the scope of the proxy
power include the power to vote on reorganization, 5 sale of assets,4 consolidation,4 7 and dissolution.4 8
One rule that may be even more significant here is that one may
not vote the proxies he holds to benefit himself unless his interest is
disclosed.4 9 The application of this rule to the problem of standards of
disclosure is weakened, however, because this self-interest must only
be disclosed at the time of the vote and not necessarily at the time the
proxy is solicited50
137 N.Y.S.2d 142 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aft'd, 285 App. Div. 927, 139 N.Y.S.2d.
1s
883 (ist Dept.), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 719, iz8 N.E.zd 42o (x955).
For an interesting approach to several of these New York cases, see ARANOW &
EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL x6o-6i (-957).
"It isevident that such a rule is far too broad to be helpful. Adherence to such astandard, if itmay be so termed, can only result in additional confusion and indecisiveness and eventually lead the courts farther away from the realization of an equitable
and workable standard. What is "so tainted with fraud" is no less uncertain than what
is "material."
See Loss 541-43.
4
aFarish v. Crenegruta Copper Co., 1z Ariz. 235, oo Pac. 781 (1909).
"aMoore v. Ensley, 112 Ala. 228, 20 So. 744 (1896).
"Fidelity Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Thompson, 119 Mo. 668, 25 S.W. 211 (191g).
8
McKee v. Home Savings & Trust Co., 122 Iowa 731, 98 N.W. 609 (1904). But
see Josephson v. First Nat'l Bank, 42 N.J. Super. 461, 127 A.2d 2io (1956), concerning a change in the number of directors.
9
Blair v. F. H. Smith Co., 18 Del. Ch. i5o, 156 At. 207 (Ch. 1931 ) ; Lowman v.
Harvey R. Pierce Co., 276 Pa. 382, 12o At. 404 (.923).
Go FLETCHER § 2o6o; Loss 5z; LATriN, op. cit. supra note 17, at 308-09.
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Finally, general proxy power must be specifically negatived, or the
proxy holder will have wide latitude on how to vote.5 '
'PERMISSIBLE PUFFING' OF PROXY DATA

It is interesting to note the limits to which a soliciting group may go
in advocating its cause. This question gains added significance in light
of the New York and Delaware rules, where words such as "materiality," "relevancy," and "fraud" play major roles. One court, as in the
Gray case, may emphasize stockholder protection and place the burden
on the soliciting group to avoid misleading statements. Other courts,
however, exhibit an attitude more favorable to soliciting groups and
decline to recognize criteria such as those suggested in Gray. This was
illustrated in Kerbs v. California E. Airways,52 where, in considering
allegedly fraudulent and misleading statements made by the soliciting
53
group, the court commented:
The matter must be viewed ...with a realization that, as in other types
of campaigns, the verbal niceties are not always observed. There is almost
necessarily an area of what might be called 'permissible puffing' of one's
candidacy.
A third group of courts has gone even further, making stockholder
relief almost impossible. In Schlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp.,"
the Illinois Appellate Court stated:
[S]ufficiency of disclosure is only one element to be considered when inquiry
is made into the propriety of the transaction. The directors are not bound to
disclose to the shareholders every business transaction engaged in by the
corporation during the year ....

No shareholder was under any compulsion

to execute a proxy. It must be presumed that the shareholders who gave
proxies in response to the letter . . .were satisfied with the disclosure of the

facts contained in the letter.
"Tilden v. Quaker Oats Co., i F.2d i6o (7th Cir. 1924), (where it was held that
this latitude included the power to vote on ratification of management action) ; Mutual
Res. Fund Life Ass'n v. Taylor, 99 Va. 208, 37 S.E. 854 (19ox). Cf. Rice & Hutchins,
Inc. v. Triplex Shoe Co., 16 Del. Ch. 298, 147 Atl. 317 (Ch. 1929).

An interesting and lengthy discussion of these principles is found in Axe, Corporate
Proxies, 41 MICH. L. REV. 38 (1942).
See Demmler, surpra note 31; LArIN, op. cit. supra note 17, at 306.
63 33 Del. Ch. 395, 94 A.zd 217 (Ch. 1953). A similar diversity exists in New
York courts. Compare In re Hoe & Co., 137 N.Y.S.zd 142 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd,
285 App. Div. 927, 139 N.Y.S.zd 883 (1st Dept.), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 719, xz8 N.E.zd
420 (1955), quith In re Scheuer, 59 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
53 33 Del. Ch. 395, 94 A.zd 217, 218 (Ch. -953).
'35o Ill. App. 293, 298, 112 N.E.2d 7x6, 717 (1953).
55
1d. at 298, 112 N.E.zd at 721.

Vol. 196o: 623]

UNLISTED SECURITIES

This relatively recent case unjustly shifts the burden to the stockholder,
giving him the choice of personally voting his stock, which is a virtual
impossibility in many instances, giving his proxy in silence, or not voting
at all. In addition, the court placed great emphasis on the fact that
there was no specific allegation that the failure to disclose was wrongful,
treating such an allegation as a prerequisite to recovery. In the Schemer
case, however, the court granted relief where the solicitation materials
were false and misleading regardless of whether the statements were
made "carelessly, recklessly, or deliberately."' 6
APPLICATION OF THE SEC PROXY RULES TO UNLISTED SECURITIES

To what extent have the state and federal courts deferred to the
standards of the Securities and Exchange Commission when considering
the adequacy of disclosure in the solicitation of proxies of unlisted securities? Whether these standards could or should be used is a question on
which the courts have remained relatively silent.57 Generally, however,
the SEC rules have been treated as exclusively federal in application."
This question was squarely presented in Bresnick v. Home Title
Guar. Co."9 The plaintiff's basic contention was that the proxies were
obtained "improperly, unfairly, and illegally. '6 0 It was strongly urged
that the SEC rules should guide the court even though the securities
involved were unlisted. Disregarding this contention, the court stated
that "the test is not compliance with the technical rules, but rather
whether the proxy-soliciting material was so tainted with fraud that an
"In re Scheuer, 59 N.Y.S.zd 500, 501 (Sup. Ct. 1942).

"' At least one case has arisen where the language of the court implied that, if the
occasion presented itself, the proxy rules would be considered. In O'Connor v. Fergang,
14 Misc. 2d 1o95, 1097, 182 N.Y.S.2d 942, 944 (Sup. Ct. 1958), the court stated:

"Be it noted that in this case the notices and proceedings were not subject to the
Securities Exchange Commission Regulations. But even accepting such standards, the
communications here do not vary substantially from other proxy battles under S.E.C.
Regulations."
8 Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that the district courts
of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over violations of the proxy rules.
On the basis of this section, state courts have declined to consider such violations when
passing upon the adequacy of disclosure. Standard Power & Light Corp. v. Investment
Associates, 29 Del. Ch. 225, 51 A.2d 572 (Ch. 1947), affirming 29 Del. Ch. 225, 48
A.2d 501 (946); Eliasburg v. Standard Oil Co., 23 N.J. Super. 431, 92 A.2d 862
(953) ; In re Hoe & Co., 137 N.Y.S.2d 142
(Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd, 285 App. Div. 927, 139 N.Y.S.zd 883 (ist Dept.), aff'd, 309
N.Y. 719, 128 N.E.2d 420 (x955).
so 175 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. x959).
"Id. at 724.
(1952), aff'd, 12 N.J. 467, 97 A.zd 43
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inequitable result was accomplished."'" In thus dismissing the SEC
rules as "technical," the court preserved the integrity of the New York
standard, and, in a brief opinion that cited no cases for support, ignored
the basic problem. Representing, as they do, the combined knowledge
of experts in the field of securities regulation and the product of exhaustive research, it appears that, even in the absence of legislation, the
rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission should be used in
the state courts as a guide to what is practical and desirable practice.
STATE LEGISLATIVE STANDARDS

The proxy is the creature of the legislature, as its use was not permitted at common law.62 Today, there are provisions in every jurisdiction, except one," expressly authorizing the use of the proxy. These
statutes, however, generally deal only with the form, sufficiency, and
revocability of the proxy and, with few exceptions, are silent on the
problem of adequate disclosure. 4
California was the first state to take significant action on the problem
when it enacted the following statute:5
In soliciting proxies authorizing the holder thereof to vote in favor of any
amendment to the articles [of incorporation] . . .or in soliciting written

consents of shareholders thereto, the corporation shall mail to each shareholder of the corporation .. .a concise summary of the proposed amendment
and the changes proposed to be effected thereby in the rights of the shareholder.
a"Id. at 725.

"'Re Dean and Chapter of Fernes, Davies Rep. 116 (1607); Taylor v. Griswold, 2

Green 222 (N.J. 1834).
e'See note 2 sup ra.

6,The statutes of several jurisdictions simply authorize proxy voting and no more.

Illustrative are ALA. CODE tit.
10, § 38 (Supp. 1955) ; HAWAII REV. LAWS § 172-24
(1956) ;

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.32 (1956) 5 MISS. CODE ANN. § 5326 (z956)

5

NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-135 (1954); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-4-2 (x956), UTAH
CODE ANN. § 16-2-4o (1953)5 WYo. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 17-12 (1959).
The statutes of the remaining jurisdictions include provisions which vary in their
requirements, but usually include sections concerning written appointments, periodic
validity, appointment of more than one proxy, and sale of assets. Almost all the more
complicated statutes have provisions concerning the termination of the proxy. For a
look at some of the more exhaustive statutes, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.z8
(1957)5 NJ. REv. STAT. § 14:10-9 (Supp. 1957); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-68 (Supp.
1955).

asCAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 3637 (1956).
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Although the California statute is limited to assuring adequate disclosure in only one situation, that concerning the amendment of the
articles of incorporation, the legislature has at least undertaken to enact
some remedial laws.
Oklahoma followed California with a statute that closely parallels
that of the latter"0 and is limited to disclosure requirements when
0 7
amending the articles of incorporation.
The actions of California and Oklahoma represent the only state
legislative activity on the problem. It would seem that the burden of
prescribing the standards of disclosure should fall on the legislatures
rather than the courts, because the real need is protection of stockholders as a class through a unified system of regulation rather than
protection of the individual stockholder through judicial relief.
SUMMARY

From the above analysis, it appears that a legislative and judicial
change of policy toward standards of proxy solicitation is long overdue.
Only through the achievement of workable standards that have for their
purpose a guarantee to the stockholder of enough information to enable
him to exercise his franchise effectively and intelligently will control
once again be placed in the hands of ownership, where it rightly belongs.
The following suggestions are designed to effectuate such standards:
(i) The Securities Exchange Act should be amended to require that
adequate disclosure be made regardless of whether there is a solicitation.
(2) Legislation should be enacted to bring large, publicly-owned
corporations within the purview of the Securities and Exchange Commission regardless of whether their stock is listed or registered on a
national exchange.
(3) The federal listing requirement should be made more realistic,
making the size of the corporation or the number of stockholders the
criteria of registration.
(4) The state courts should insure protection to the stockholder
through the establishment of minimum standards of disclosure or, in
the alternative, consider the proxy rules of the Securities and Exchange
Commission when passing upon the adequacy of disclosure in solicitation.
(5) The state legislatures should enact appropriate legislation calling for minimum disclosure requirements.
00

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. iS,

§

1-I54 (1951).

o For an interesting discussion of the Oklahoma statute, see Vliet, The Oklahoma
Business Corporation Act (pt. 1), 2 OKLA. L. REV. I (1949).

